Fordham Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 3

Article 2

1970

Pueblo, E.C. 121, and Beyond: A Suggested Analysis
Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., Pueblo, E.C. 121, and Beyond: A Suggested Analysis, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 439
(1970).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol38/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Pueblo, E.C. 121, and Beyond: A Suggested Analysis
Cover Page Footnote
Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol38/iss3/2

PUEBLO, E.C. 121, AND BEYOND: A
SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
CORNELIUS F. MURPHY, JR.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

rJHE downing of a reconnaissance aircraft by the North Koreans, as
well as their prior seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, suggests that we may
be entering upon another long night on the Asian continent. The increasing tension between the United States and North Korea means that many
difficult foreign policy choices lay ahead; choices which, if they are to
rise above the harsh regime of power politics, must be guided by meaningful jural principles. For if those decisions are to be conducive to lasting peace, they must be based upon advice which objectively evaluates
the issues as much as it provides legal arguments to defend desired
choices. Yet, such an objective is difficult to realize.
One obstacle is the fact that advocacy is an integral part of scholarship
ostensibly devoted to the establishment of international law.' Given the
existence of a vital national interest, one can assume that the energies of
most international lawyers will be devoted to the marshaling of legal
argumentation in favor of existing foreign policy. In some measure, such
partialities are defensible. International jurists cannot-indeed should
not--completely separate themselves from their national origins. Moreover, the extreme complexity of most global conflicts provides a leeway
which one can, in good faith, develop in a manner most advantageous to
one's country.
But such an attitude is a significant barrier to the development of
world order. One of the most unpalatable principles of international law
is that its rules are dependent upon general consensus rather than
limited assent. The de facto economic and military superiority of the
United States vis-&-vis many other nations makes it psychologically
difficult for the American international lawyer to bring to his work such
a universal spirit. The Hickenlooper Amendment,2 purporting to recite as
a rule of international law a private property standard which is manifestly
without general acceptance, illustrates the difficulty at the political level.
Unfortunately, the same proclivity to generalize particular precepts
prevails in the world of legal scholarship. Much of the debate surrounding the Vietnam War in legal journals, with some conspicuous excep* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. See Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-Gaps in
Legal Thinking, 50 Va. L. Rev. 231 (1964).
2. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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tions,5 reflects this national-interest mentality. Such advocacy is detrimental because it runs against the fundamental purpose of ideas, which
is to transcend contingencies and provide a broad basis for the appraisal
of particular events.
Selection of applicable legal rules depends upon a prior characterization of the relevant issues. Professor Falk has demonstrated how preliminary identifications of adversary conduct as "aggression" made available the legal norms needed to legitimize American policy in Vietnam.'
The same psychology of issue preference and selection has already been
used in our conflicts with the North Koreans and it is imperative that
such a priori forms of analysis be moderated, if we hope to approximate
a clear juridical understanding of the relative rights and responsibilities.
Secretary Rusk's invocation of the Geneva Convention on the Law of the
Sea as a source of relevant norms in the Pueblo incidente reflected the desirability, from the perspective of national interests, of characterizing the
problem in terms of the laws of peace. In fact, however, the fundamental
relationship between North Korea and the United States lies somewhere
between war and peace, and a failure to refer to this twilight status as a
starting point for legal analysis impairs the value of the subsequent jural
argumentation.

II.

THE JURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE KOREAN WAR

Korean hostilities began on June 24, 1950, when North Korean forces
crossed the 38th parallel and entered South Korea. The United States
met the attack and sought a condemnation by the United Nations' Security Council. The Council determined that the invasion constituted a
breach of the peace and called for an immediate termination of hostilities.' Subsequent resolutions recommended that members of the United
3. See, e.g., Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War,
75 Yale L.. 1122 (1966); Moore, International Law and the United States in Viet Nam: A
Reply, 76 Yale LJ. 1051 (1967); Falk, International Law and the United States Role in
Viet Nam: A Response to Professor Moore, 76 Yale L.J. 1095 (1967).
4. See Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75
Yale L.J. 1122 (1966).
5. "Let me point out something that is quite important here. Warships on the high

seas-according to the 1958 conventions on the law of the sea-warships on the high seas
have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state.
"Now, let's assume just for a moment what is obviously not true from the testimony from
all sides, including the North Korean side, that this ship was picked up in territorial waters,
or in waters claimed by North Korea to be territorial waters. Even there, under the convention of the law of the sea, 1958, article 23, it makes it quite clear that if any warship
comes into territorial waters, the coastal state can require it to leave. It does not obtain a
right to seize it." Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Discuss Viet-Nam and
Korea on "Meet the Press", Feb. 4, 1968, in 58 Dep't State Bull. 261, 265 (1968).
6. 5 U.N. SCOR, 474th meeting 4 (1950) (footnote omitted).
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Nations furnish South Korea with necessary assistance, 7 and that the
contributing forces be unified under a command led by the United States.'
These actions by the Security Council occurred in the absence of the
Soviet Union's representative. Upon his return, the Soviet member,
Mr. Malik, challenged the legality of the resolutions, primarily on the
ground that the conflict was a domestic civil war beyond the purview of
United Nations' jurisdiction. 9 A Soviet veto prevented the passage of a
further draft proposal submitted by the United States which would have
condemned North Korean defiance of the earlier resolution.10 The General Assembly then assumed jurisdiction of the controversy, established
a Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea," and, in
the famous Uniting for Peace Resolution,' - sought to sustain the power
of the United Nations to make appropriate recommendations to its members for the maintenance of international peace.
Hostilities continued, intensified by the intervention of Chinese Communist troops in November, 1950. The painful conflict persisted until,
following the personal attention of President Eisenhower, a settlement
was finally agreed upon. Following agreements relative to the repatriation
of prisoners of war, a military Armistice was signed at Panmunjom,
Korea, on July 27, 1953, between the United Nations Command and
representatives of the Korean People's Army (North Korea) and the
Chinese People's Volunteers."3
What is the jural significance of these events? To what extent do they
provide a frame of reference for assessing the reciprocal responsibilities
of the participants? It is upon the total effect of these events that a basis
must be discovered for determining the ongoing juridical relationship between the United States and the North Koreans.
7. Id. at 5.
8. 5 U.N. SCOR, 476th meeting 10 (1950).
9. L. Sohn, The United Nations in Action 65-68 (1968).

10. 5 U.N. SCOI 479th meeting 10 (1950).
11. GA. Res. 376, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). For prior
General Assembly involvement see GA. Res. 195, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 25 (1948), recognizing
the Government of the Republic of Korea (South) as the only lawful government in Korea.
12. GA. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
13. Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command on the one
hand, and The Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of
the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in
Korea, in Letter Dated 7 August 1953 From The Acting United States Representative To
The United Nations Addressed To The Secretary General, Transmitting A Special Report

Of The Unified Command On The Armistice In Korea In Accordance With The Security
Council Resolution Of 7 July 1950 (S/1588), U.N, Doc. A/2431 (1953) thereinafter cited as
Armistice (as reprinted in 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 186 (Supp. 1953))].
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An armistice is a means of abating hostilities between belligerents. 14
In analyzing the significance of the Panmunjom document, it is necessary
to first determine whether the prior relationship between the parties
should properly be characterized in terms of belligerency. The difficulty
arises from the fact that the allied military operations were carried on
under the aegis of Security Council recommendations. Thus, a preliminary
issue arises as to whether action by members of the United Nations
against an entity branded as a peace-breaker by that Organization can
properly be identified by a state of war.
Assuming the illegality of the North Korean invasion, it is not inconsistent to refer to the resulting military action as a war. Any relation of
armed violence may properly be so designated, not to avoid attributions
of fault, but to promote a stabilization of the conflict. Applying the laws
of war to uses of force brings to bear upon the conflict a body of jural
precepts designed to reduce the inevitable suffering and to clarify the
relationship between the participants and other members of the international community.' 5 During early stages of the Korean conflict, suggestions that the Unified Command could, acting under the auspices of the
United Nations, selectively apply the laws of war were repudiated by the
commander in the field, and at the time of the armistice all combatants
were applying considerable portions of the rules of war to their treatment
of prisoners.'0
There are other considerations which militate against structuring the
United States-North Korean relationship in terms of a sanctioning process
against an aggressor. The Security Council's initial determination that
the North Korean attack constituted a breach of peace was an act of
great moral significance. Yet, it should not be forgotten that it was done
in the absence of the Soviet Union, a political fact which weakens the
operative force of the resolution. More importantly, the Unified Command's action was not, in any meaningful sense, the action of the United
Nations. The participating states' involvement was voluntary, which
makes a juridical link between their activities and the United Nations'
14. J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 643-46 (1959); Levie, The Nature
and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 880 (1956).
15. J. Stone, supra note 14, at 314-16; Baxter, Constitutional Form and Some Legal
Problems of International Military Command, 29 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 325 (1952); Baxter,
So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l
L. 323, 324 (1951).
16. Levie, Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners of War, 56 Am. J. Int'l L.
433, 442 (1962); Taubenfeld, International Armed Forces and the Rules of War, 45 Am. J.
Int'l L. 671, 678 (1951). As Levie's article makes clear, there were substantial violations of
the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners during the conflict, especially by the
Chinese. On mistreatment, see also M_. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 23-24
(1959).
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implausible. 17 Further, the absence of meaningful direction from the
United Nations, together with the de facto United States control of the
military operation, make accurate Professor Baxter's observation that
"the Unified Command is the United States."18
One further obstacle to adopting the status of belligerency should be
considered. It has been argued that the United Nations Charter has
abolished war. Consequently, participants in an international conflict are
no longer permitted to conduct themselves as belligerents. 0 The argument is ethically attractive, but when put forth in unconditional form it
is not convincing. The primary difficulty with the theory is that an
effective supra-national authority simply does not exist. In light of this
elementary fact, it may be preferable, for humanitarian purposes, to refer
to a relationship of conflict in terms of the rules of war. The question is
a pragmatic one. In some contexts, reliance upon a status of belligerency
may be incompatible with the quest for peace; 2 ° but it would be dogmatic
to assert that the measurement of any international conflict in those
terms is improper.
Moving beyond these general considerations, what was the juridical
effect of the Armistice signed at Panmunjom? If it assumed a prior relationship of belligerency, what effect did the Armistice have upon that
relationship? It is possible for an armistice to be a final resolution of an
armed conflict. Whether or not such is the case depends upon the inten21
tion of the parties as determined by an examination of the document.
The Korean Armistice was clearly designed to suspend hostilities rather
than constitute a final treaty of peace. The Preamble recites the pledge
of the parties to bring an end to the bloodshed as a means of working
towards a future settlement:
17. H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 934-36 (1964); J. Stone, supra note 14, at
234-37. Bowett argues that the Korean operation was an enforcement action within the
Charter, mainly on the grounds that Article 39 has a Chapter VII reference. D. Bowett,
United Nations Forces 33-34 (1964).
18. Baxter, Constitutional Forms and Some Legal Problems of International Military
Command, 29 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 325, 334 (1952).
19. See the statements of the Israeli delegate to the United Nations, 6 U.N. SCOR,
549th meeting 11-12 (1951), quoted in R. Higgins, The Development of International Law
Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 214 (1963).
20. By resolution of September 1, 1951, the Security Council held that visit and search
operations being conducted by Egypt were incompatible with the General Armistice Agreement then in effect. 6 U.N. SCOR, 558th meeting 56 (1951). The value of the resolution as
a general precedent is limited by the fact of its reference to the Armistice concluded with
extensive United Nations involvement, and by the consideration that Security Council members apparently treated the resolution as a "political" rather than a "legal" act. See the
discussion in P. Baxter, The Law of International Waterways 224-36 (1964).
21. J. Stone, supra note 14, at 643-46.
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The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one
hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander
of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the

Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with
the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of
hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is
achieved do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound
and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following
Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely
military in character ....22

During the period that an armistice is in effect, the weight of authority
is that the state of war continues and its rules govern the belligerents'
conduct. 23 What is permissible conduct is primarily determined by reference to the agreement; the signatories must refrain from the conduct
prohibited by its terms. Under the terms of the Korean armistice, the
parties agreed to a cessation of all hostilities by armed forces under
their control; ground, naval, and air forces were obliged to respect the
physical and coastal areas under the control of their adversaries.24
Espionage activities would be lawful both under an interpretation of
the armistice and under general rules of warfare. An armistice suspends
only those belligerency rights which it expressly proscribes. The Korean
document is aimed at prohibiting active military operations and the related issues for balance of forces. Moreover, intelligence gathering is
considered lawful by tradition in international conflict in light of the
grave importance of learning of the entire disposition of forces within
enemy territory.2 5 The more difficult questions arise in determining the
extent to which espionage can be considered protected conduct and the
corresponding rights and responsibilities of the target state.
III. THE BELLIGERENTS' RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
RELATING TO ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

Much of the legal argumentation developed during the Pueblo incident
was designed to characterize the seizure as illegal because of an alleged
22. Armistice at 186-87.
23. M. Greenspan, supra note 16, at 325; Levie, supra note 14, at 884. But see Baxter,
supra note 18 for the argument that belligerency is incompatible with an armistice agreement.
24. Armistice at 192.
25. Convention With Respect To The Laws And Customs Of War On Land, 32 Stat.
1803 (1902), T.S. No. 960. "Ruses of war and the employment of methods necessary to obtain
information about the enemy and the country, are considered allowable." Id. at 1818. Under
Article 29 of the Convention one is a spy who "acting clandestinely, or on false pretences,
... obtains, or seeks to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with
the intention of communicating it to the hostile party." Id. at 1818-19. See also M. Greenspan, supra note 16, at 325; 2 L. Oppenheim, International Law § 159 (8th ed. 1958);
J. Stone, supra note 14, at 563-64. Greenspan is also of the opinion that espionage need not
be discontinued during an armistice. M. Greenspan, supra note 16, at 340.
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violation of the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea

and the Contiguous Zone.28 As intelligence gathering has become a widespread practice among states not at war, it has become necessary to

measure the relationship to some degree by those territorial and jurisdictional concepts which are an essential part of the law of peace. Their use
in relations with the Soviet Union has apparently yielded successful

results, and an effort has been made to apply these norms to the Korean
situation. Thus, it was argued that if the Pueblo was within North Korean
territorial waters, the only proper response would have been to escort her
to the high seas.17 But such forms of evaluation lose their force as prime

standards of judgment in the question of espionage vis-h-vis North
Korea because the relationship, if not strictly one of belligerence, is more

realistically conceptualized in those terms than upon assumptions of
peaceful relations.

Moreover, the stability which such concepts seek to achieve does not
necessarily lead to that result. Insistence upon such precise standards is

premised upon the belief that they give a clear indication of permissible
behavior, thus minimizing the potentials for violent confrontation. Yet,

strict jurisdictional standards can also make it possible for the participants to exaggerate the situation once the line is crossed. This is espe-

cially true when the underlying relationship between the parties is one of
intense hostility. The North Koreans claimed that the Pueblo had pene-

trated their territorial waters and that, therefore, the United States was
guilty of aggression. Similarly, some Americans argued that the attack

was an act of war, a judgment premised upon the belief that the ship
was on the high seas when it was intercepted.2 8
26. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, March 24, 1961, [19641
15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.. 206.
27. See, e.g., Aldrich, Questions of International Law Raised by the Seizure of the US.S.
Pueblo, 1969 Proceedings of the Am. Soc'y of Int'l L. 2. This paper by the Assistant Legal
Advisor of the Department of State is illustrative. It reasons that if one assumes arguendo
that the Pueblo was within the North Korean territorial sea, the remedies of evacuation
provided by Article 23 would be applicable. See also the subsequent paper by Butler, The
Pueblo Crisis: Some Critical Reflections, 1969 Proceedings, supra, at 7, which displays a
better grasp of the complexities. It should be noted that North Korea caim a 12 mile
territorial sea, while United States practice is generally to recognize only a three mile limit
plus extensions for limited purposes such as fisheries. North Korea is not a party to the
1958 Convention. However, its prescriptions could be applied as customary rules. The
present argument is that the body of rules known as the international law of the sea rests
upon premises of peace which cannot realistically be applied to the antagonistic relationship
between the United States and North Korea. The release of the crew of the Pueblo is
documented in 8 Int'l Legal Materials 198 (1969).
28. See the positions reported in the N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1968, at 1, col. 8; id., Jan. 25,
1968, at 1, col. 6. Statements by Dean Rusk that the seizure was an act of war are reported in 58 Dep't State Bull. 191 (1968). Ambassador Goldberg referred to the North
Korean action as "nothing less than a deliberate, premeditated armed attack on a United
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The allocation of rights and duties can be more accurately gauged
once the form of characterization is in terms of belligerency. Indeed,
that is how the parties have chosen to characterize their conduct by the
terms of the Armistice Agreement. Considered as a question of belligerent, or quasi-belligerent relations, it would be improper to restrict the
right of interdiction to the perimeters of territorial jurisdiction which
form the basis of peaceful intercourse. Some more flexible test would
be more appropriate. Whether or not the Pueblo and the EC 121 were
interdicted at a point within reasonable proximity to the coast of North
Korea is a question which does not, on available information, admit of a
definitive answer. Even so, a great amount of juristic effort should not
be expended in seeking the answer, for the more important question is
the nature of the remedy rather than the right of a target state to interfere with intelligence gathering.
Traditionally, the right of one belligerent to gather information has
been matched by a corresponding privilege in the target state to apply
whatever punishment to a captured spy it deems appropriate. Generally,
the penalty has been death, a supreme measure justified by the danger
posed to a nation by having its military plans discovered by an adversary.29 Whatever the cogency of these justifications in the past, they do
not seem to be persuasive in the present context of the requirements of
human dignity and world order.
Implicit in the theory that surveillance or spying constitutes dangers of
sufficient magnitude to permit extreme penalties are assumptions about
the range of legitimate belligerent activities which cannot be reconciled
with prevailing attitudes toward war. While a status of belligerency has
not been eliminated from global power processes, there is a widespread
viewpoint that the active use of military force across frontiers is proscribed unless such operations can be justified as a measure of immediate
self-defense. Conceding the difficulties surrounding a definition of aggression, the apparent desire of nations-from the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
Nuremburg Trials and the regime of the United Nations Charter-is to
severely restrict the extent to which belligerency can be equated with
full discretion to engage in armed violence. 80 These restrictions upon the
States naval vessel on the high seas .

. . ."

Letter from Arthur Goldberg to Agha Shahl,

President of the U.N. Security Council, Jan. 25, 1968, in 58 Dep't State Bull. 196 (1968).
In the Congress, Senator Church was more explicit: "Mr. President, the seizure of the Pueblo
and her crew by North Korea is more than an act of piracy on the high seas; It Is an act
of war against the United States." 114 Cong. Rec. 5372 (1968) (remarks of Senator Church).
For a Soviet use of the territorial argument, see the statement of Premier Kosygin reported
in the N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
29. See note 28 supra.
30. See Q. Wright, A Study of War 372 (1942); Stone, The Problem of Definition of
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legitimate uses of force undercut much of the rationale behind the
positive rule that a danger to a belligerent's operational plan is a sufficient reason to allow him to apply maximum penalties to a captured
spy.
Another reason why the traditional license to apply maximum penalties is unpersuasive is because it is not sufficiently responsive to the
human values at stake. What is often forgotten is that the laws of war
are designed to protect persons affected by violence rather than to expand
the capacity of belligerents to extend the inevitable suffering. More precisely, questions of rights and duties in the context of belligerency must
be considered more in the light of persons affected than in terms of an
inflated state power offended by intelligence gathering.
Part of the traditional reason espionage activities have been deemed
legitimate is because of the deference given to the patriotic motivations
of those who engage in espionage. 3 ' Yet, heretofore, such activities have
not gained protection beyond an abstract assurance that such activities
are lawful. Those participating, without meaningful protection, are designated as "unprivileged" belligerents. 2 Whether the crews of the Pueblo
and E.C. 121 should be considered spies is debatable. Let us assume the
most adverse characterization to emphasize the wrongfulness of the North
Korean response. To place the situation into a more balanced perspective,
it should be noted that those who participate in such activities may well
be promoting the interests of a much wider community than their own
nationality would superficially reveal.
We have already insisted that the basic conflict should be characterized as a relationship of belligerency between the United States and North
Korea. Such a characterization seems required because the Unified
Command is, in substance, a military operation of the United States.
Moreover, the Command is not an organ of the United Nations. But such
a description, while necessary for proper legal analysis, does not preclude an appraisal of the participants' actions in the light of general community values. The Pueblo crew and the aviators on the EC 121 were
involved in an effort to serve their national interests. But, from the perspective of world power processes, they sought to detect and, thus help to
deter, activities which might endanger world peace.
It is in the light of these value positions-the very limited interests
which North Korea could legitimately protect and the value to all peoples
Aggression, in J. Stone, supra note 14, at 330. The Security Council resolution of 25 June 1950
condemning the initial North Korean attack as breach of the peace further restricts the
range of permissible military activity. See 5 U.N. SCOR, 474th meeting 4 (1950).
31.

See note 25 supra.

32.

See Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28

Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 323 (1951).
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which the surveillance was designed to promote-that the North Korean
response to our intelligence gathering must be measured. And in both
situations their reactions were disproportionate.
Given the proximity of the Pueblo to the coastline, it is arguable that
the Koreans acted within the scope of their belligerency rights in seizing
the ship and retaining it pending an apology. Yet, their treatment of the
crew was reprehensible, involving threats and torture tactics which
violated all precepts of common humanity. Given the consciousness of
the value of human dignity, the fact that the conduct of the prisoners
may not have been within the technical range of the Geneva Conventions' should not be conclusive of an authoritative evaluation of the
treatment.
In addition, the shooting down of the unarmed reconnaisance plane
cannot be justified, especially if it were known to be such, and if it were,
as alleged by President Nixon, fired upon while leaving or flying away
from Korean territory.8 4 Upon such a factual hypothesis it would be
morally impossible to legitimize the use of force which sent thirty-one
men to their death.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF FUTURE POLICY

In considering future policy toward North Korea, what takes immediate prominence are justified measures of self-defense. Given the
explicit recognition of the Republic of South Korea by the United Nations, our assistance to her defense against overt uses of force is consistent with accepted global policies. Comparable rights are available
33. It is the opinion of Professor Baxter that the unprivileged status of spies was not removed by the Geneva Convention Relative To The Treatment of Prisoners of War of August
12, 1949, July 14, 1955, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3317, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See Baxter,
supra note 32, at 328-29. It is arguable that the officers and crew of the Pueblo would fall
within the terms of the Convention since at the time of capture they were acting as naval
personnel, i.e., as "members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict" within the language of Article 4. Whatever doubts exist about the applicability of the Convention's standards should, in light of the interests at stake, be resolved in favor of their application. The
Convention, to which North Korea is a signatory, expressly prohibits, in Article 130, torture
or inhuman treatment and the willful infliction of injury to body and health. For a discussion of the motivations behind the Convention, see Levie, supra note 16. The North Korean
reservation to Article 85 of the Geneva Convention For The Amelioration Of The Condition
Of The Wounded And Sick In Armed Forces In The Field Of August 12, 1949, July 14, 1955,
[19561 6 U.S.T. 3115, TI.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, which sought to insure application of
the Convention to prisoners prosecuted for acts committed prior to capture, does not excuse
the treatment of the Pueblo crew. See Reservations Made By The Democratic People's
Republic Of Korea Upon Accession, 278 U.N.T.S. 263 (1957). There is no rational basis
for evaluating the intelligence gathering activities as "war crimes" or "inhumane offences"
and if guilty, it would not excuse the cruelties inflicted during incarceration.
34. Presidential News Conference of April 18, 1969, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1969, at 14,
col. 1.
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under the terms of the Armistice Agreement. But it would be erroneous
to conclude that an exclusively defensive posture exhausts our duties to
the international community. A careful examination of the history
of the Korean people reveals expectations which cannot be reconciled
with a solidification of the status quo.
Because of their strategic geographical position, the Koreans have
always been frustrated in their efforts to gain national cohesion. A brief
period of unity, about 600 A.D., was shattered by the periodic interventions of Mongol and Chinese war lords. By the eighteenth century, Japan
had become a major contender for Korean hegemony and, after defeating
the Chinese in the latter half of the nineteenth century, gained a controlling interest on the Korean peninsula.
During all these viscissitudes, the Koreans' aspirations for national
freedom persisted. The United States was naturally sympathetic with
these desires for independence. Our interest waned, however, after the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904 revealed the magnitude of Japan's strength.
In the ensuing settlement, the subservience of Korea to Japanese power
was accepted in exchange for a recognition of our position in the Philippines. Korean patriots were outraged by what they considered to be a
((sell out," yet realpolitikprevailed, and in 1910, Japan formally annexed
Korea as part of her growing, and ominous, empire. 5
With the outbreak of World War HI, the Korean movement for independence gained a new impetus and an international policy toward a
Korean future began to emerge slowly. In the famous Cairo Pledge of
1943, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Chiang KaiShek affirmed their common desire to prosecute the Pacific War and recorded their conviction that Korea should attain her liberty.u
At first, an international trusteeship was planned, but efforts to develop
this policy were suspended by the dropping of the atomic bomb, which
brought Russia into the Pacific War. Soviet troops were soon in northern
Korea. At the time of the Japanese defeat, the thirty-eighth parallel was
designed as a convenient reference point for the surrender of troops to
the respective Russian and American commands. There was no thought
of final permanent division of the nation.37
At the Moscow Conference of 1945, a joint Soviet-American commission on unification was established."' But efforts to implement the proposals proved unsuccessful, especially in light of Russian efforts to exclude Syngman Rhee from participation in the political processes and
35. See C. Berger, The Korea Knot (rev. ed. 1964).
36. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea,
are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. Korea's Independence, Dep't State Publication No. 2933, at 16-17 (1947).
37. See C. Berger, supra note 35.

38. Id.
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their evident intention to impose a minority government upon the entire
country. Moreover, the increasing Cold War made practical accord virtually impossible.
In September, 1947, the United States referred the issue to the General
Assembly of the United Nations. In the subsequent political maneuvering,
the Russians dramatically called for troop withdrawal, while the United
States insisted upon the priority of national elections. 89 In November,
the Assembly established a temporary commission on Korea40 which was
refused permission to enter the territory north of the parallel. The commission was then ordered to observe elections where it had access and,
in its final report, gave its opinion that elections in the South were a
valid expression of free choice by the people. The Assembly then recognized the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea and
established a new commission on Korea to assist in the unification of
the entire area.4 1 In October, 1949, it prophetically requested the new
commission to "observe and report any developments which might lead
'42
to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea.
On June 24, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the parallel and the
Korean War began. After a bloody conflict of three years, a military
armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. As previously noted, the Agreement did not constitute a final settlement, but rather suspended hostilities
so as "to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the
holding by both sides of a political conference at a higher level."4
This painfully complex mosaic of ethnic aspirations, geopolitics, and
jural expectations, reflects the authoritative background against which
the future United States' policy relative to Korea must be measured. The
diverse mixture of law and politics which is Korean history constitutes a
judgment of the world community that Korea is fundamentally a single
nation whose present division is an accident of world power processes.
Given this premise, it then becomes imperative that the possibilities of
approximating that ideal be thoroughly examined.
It is commonplace to attribute the failure of reunification to the obstructionism of the North Koreans and their allies. Such a charge obviously contains a great deal of truth. The historical record since 1945 is
replete with incidents in which communist objectives of minority control
and suppression of individual freedom made any rapprochement impossible.44 Yet, the hope of ultimate reunion requires that we constantly
39.
40.
41.
42.

Korea 1945-48, Dep't State Publication No. 3305, at 48-51 (1958).
GA. Res. 112, U.N. Doc. A/519 at 16 (1947).
GA. Res. 195, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 25 (1948).
GA. Res. 293, U.N. Doc. A/1251 at 15 (1949).

43.

Armistice at 188.

44.

See C. Berger, supra note 35.
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keep open the possibility that ideological strategies may be replaced with

good faith negotiation. For our part, we are obliged to examine with
whatever objectivity we can muster, the underlying reasons put forth by
our adversaries to justify their positions. The essence of justice in this
wounded world is, as Tillich remarked, the ability to listen.
A major obstacle to the settlement of the Korean question has been

the communist participant's refusal to recognize the competence of the
United Nations to supervise the political processes by which reunification
is to occur. As previously noted, in 1948, it refused to permit a United

Nations' electoral commission access to its territory, with the result that
the General Assembly certified the Republic of South Korea as the only

legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. 0 Following the armistice, the North and its allies have consistently refused to permit United
Nations' involvement in either an interim or final solution.
Difficulties have also surrounded the composition of the interim government. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, the North Korean representative, Nam Ik, proposed that an All Korean Commission be established to prepare the machinery needed to administer national elections
which would establish a new Korean government. Composition of the
commission would include appointees from the present Assemblies of
North and South as well as "Democratic social organizations." This plan
was rejected because it gave the North an equality of power within the
commission in spite of its smaller population."0
At the Geneva Conference, Chou En-Lai stated with emphasis: "This
conference has nothing to do with the United Nations.4 7 This has been
the position of the Communist bloc ever since. While the judgment is
extreme, it does contain some elements of truth which have not been
adequately considered. It should not be forgotten that United Nations'
involvement in the Korean political processes began at the height of the
Cold War, when the resolutions of the General Assembly were particularly susceptible to the ideological power struggles between Western
democracies and the Soviet Union.4" These factors diminish the extent to
which the determination of the United Nations to involve itself in the
Korean question was truly the reflection of an international consensus.
Moreover, there is something anomalous in attempts by an international
organization which is itself unrepresentative to insist upon representative
government at a national level. It is especially bizarre in the Korean
situation where major participants are not members of the organization.
45. G.A. Res. 195, U.N. IDoc. A/810 at 25 (1948).
46. The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, Dep't State Publication No. 5609,
at 11 (1954). Rejection was also premised upon United States insistence that the United
Nations observe electoral processes of the North.
47. Id. at 66.
48. See, e.g., notes 40-42 supra.
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Indeed, the real tragedy of Korea is the fact that the United Nations,
incapable of fulfilling its primary mission of security, has restricted its
official function to abortive attempts to supervise the political processes
of the conflict. By so doing, it has strengthened arguments that it is being
involved in matters of domestic jurisdiction, and has weakened its
general authority.
Also, the North Korean plan on interim procedures for reunion is not
without rational support. North Korea has all the requisites of statehood.
It has received recognition by a number of existing states, and is a
participant in international agreements. The determination by the General Assembly that the Republic of South Korea was the only legitimate
government in Korea is not conclusive of the issue because United
Nations' competence in matters of statehood is decisive only with respect
to questions of membership in the organization.40 Moreover, the reality
of statehood is independent of recognition, and there is nothing in the
United Nations Charter to suggest that the United Nations is empowered
to condition the fact of statehood upon its approval of the means by
which a particular state came to exist. Prior practice within the Security
Council has demonstrated the importance of acknowledging such realities
if the organization wishes to perform its functions5 0 As a state, North
Korea is entitled to deal with other states in the international community
on a basis of juridical equality regardless of its population. Indeed, the
United Nations is itself organized upon such a principle. It does not seem
unreasonable that an interim commission in Korea be so organized,
provided that the All Korean Government finally established be reasonably representative of the population. This is, in substance, the position
of the North Koreans. 51
The present general policy of the United Nations relative to Korea is
49.

See Letter Dated 8 March 1950 From The Secretary General To The President Of

The Security Council Transmitting A Memorandum On The Legal Aspects Of The Problem
Of Representation In The United Nations, 5 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-May 1950, at 18,
U.N. Doc. S/1466 (1950).
50. For example, the 1947 Indonesia case where the Council, after debate, agreed to the
participation of a representative of the Republic of Indonesia following hostilities between
Indonesian forces and troops of the Netherlands. Opposition was based upon an argument
that Indonesia was not a sovereign state.
51. See Dep't State Publication, supra note 46, at 120-23, where the North Korean
representatives responded to the criticism of their plan. In a memorandum of the Democratic
People's Government submitted by the Representative of the U.SS.R. to the United
Nations, the North Koreans insisted that reunification was an internal matter which should
be accomplished "by way of establishing a unified all-Korea government represented by all
sections of the population through free and democratic North-South general elections by the
Korean people themselves . . . ." U.N. Doc. A/370 at 1 (1966). If elections are not now
feasible, the memorandum recommends the establishment of a confederation with equality
of power to organize economic and cultural matters, retaining the existing independence of
the two regimes, but acting as a single nation in the realm of international affairs.
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the realization, by peaceful means, of an independent unified Korea
under a representative form of government. It is the means to the end
which is subject to dispute.12 The specific stumbling block revolves
around interim procedures, the United Nations' commission insisting
upon a population based interim government, 53 the North Korean government demanding an equal voice in any transitional arrangements. In
the light of the unrepresentative character of the United Nations and the
juridical reality of North Korea, insistence upon United Nations' intervention into the political processes of transition is unwarranted. Indeed,
it is doubtful whether direct United Nations' supervision of final elections, if any, is indispensible to the achievement of its stated goals. Some
form of accounting may be desirable, but immediate supervision can be
accomplished by neutral nations acceptable to both North and South.r"
For the United Nations to make its involvement with Korea credible,
it should reduce its concern with overall electoral processes and concentrate upon the specific human rights questions which will undoubtedly
arise in any effort to reconcile this divided country. While ethnically one,
the Koreans are separated by differing visions of the purposes of human
life. Contrary conceptions of human freedom, the organization of the
economy, the function of the state, must somehow be practically reconciled, and this is only possible where protections of basic freedoms are
insured by some international authority. Freedom of speech, for example,
is a crucial consideration and, unless it is respected by both sides, a final
reunification is impossible. Rather than attempt to exercise jurisdiction
upon dubious notions of electoral supervision, the United Nations, with
its Declaration of Human Rights 5 as a general standard, should seek to
preserve freedom throughout the processes of transition.
While these considerations of authoritative policy have been directed
principally toward the United Nations, it is not impossible to reconcile
American foreign policy with the overall objectives of the world community. This is especially true when Korean issues are viewed in relation
to our position in Vietnam. We do not insist upon an examination of the
52. See generally L. Sohn, supra note 9, at 58-74.
53. The Commission report includes as the means to reach the final objective "that elections for representatives to a National Assembly that may establish a national government
of Korea be held on the bases of adult suffrage, by secret ballot; that the number of representatives from each voting area or zone be proportionate to the population; and that the
elections should be under the supervision of the Commission." U.N. Comm'n for the Rehabilitation and Unification of Korea, Report, GA. Res 1964, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 12, at
2, U.N. Doc. A/6012 (1963). Given the disparities of population (of a total Korean population of approximately forty-three million, nearly thirty million live below the thirty-eighth
parallel) such a process would, in effect, destroy North Korea as a viable entity.
54. Such was the suggestion of Communist China at the Geneva Convention of 1954. See
Dep't State Publication, supra note 46, at 117 (Statement of Chou En-Lai).
55. GA. Res. 217(111), U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
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political basis of North Vietnam or the National Liberation Front as a
condition to our acknowledging their reality. There is no plausible reason
to maintain a contrary policy within the United Nations vis-h-vis North
Korea. And as we are willing to accept the ideological outcome of general
elections in Vietnam, we should not obstruct the political activity needed
to resolve the issues of Korea's future.
North and South Korea are ideologically divided; they also hold different conceptions about the role of the United States in that part of the
world. While our right to assist the Republic of South Korea from attack
is compatible with international law, all our activities in that area are
subservient to the overall goal of reunification of the Korean peoples. In
the light of these final objectives, North Korean demands for the removal
of United States troops56 as a prerequisite to national elections cannot be
summarily dismissed. We are inclined to smile at suggestions of freedom
in Soviet occupied Czechoslovakia, yet we miss the possible analogy in
South Korea. Given the mobility of our sea and air power, a physical
withdrawal from the South Korean territory may be compatible with
overall security. Again, our Vietnam policies will have a bearing upon
our Korean strategies.
V. CONCLUSION
If international law is to contribute to our future Korean policy, the
fundamental relationship between the participants must be grounded upon
a juridically realistic foundation. What should be emphasized is the fact
that interactions between the United States and North Korea are more
realistically conceptualized in terms of belligerency than in rhetorical
references to rules designed for peaceful intercourse. Such insistence upon
belligerency is by no means fatalistic. Within such a framework it is
possible to evaluate claims, such as those relative to intelligence gathering, in a measure which adequately protects our vital interests and the
human values at stake.
But, more importantly, emphasis upon the belligerent quality of our
relations with North Korea draws attention to the incompleteness of our
policy. An armistice has suspended armed hostilities; it looks forward to
final settlement. Such a structuring of the problem should move us from
the realm of defensive strategy toward the difficult problems of negotiating a permanent peace. To reconcile future policy with the aspirations of
mankind we must faithfully evaluate the hopes and convictions of our
adversaries as well as be on guard against their proclivities to aggression.
Only by so doing can we hope to attain that broad consensus upon which
a regime of international law and peace must ultimately rest.
56. The North Koreans have proposed that an agreed level of forces of 100,000 or less
be decided between themselves and South Korea after United States withdrawal. It has also
proposed mutual renunciation of military pacts with foreign nations.

